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Statement on Authorities 
i. cases 
0
 Boag v, MacDougal is invoked in regards to the entire 
following document, and the requirement that the pleadings of pro 
se litigants are to be construed liberally. This standard should 
have been applied to the original petition as well. Boag v. Mac-
Dougal, 454 US 364, 70 LEd.2d 894, 102 SCt 1697(1964). 
° Bouie v. Columbia, Rogers v. Tennessee, and Smith v.-
Scott" are invoked for their decisions on "ex post facto11 issues, 
and are applied to argument A,iii, the tolling of the Utah sentence 
0
 State v. Grate (or Grate v. State) is invoked for its 
ruling on what constitutes when a person has been "charged". It is 
applied to argument A,ii, the cancelation of revocation hearing. 
0
 Houston v. Lack, 487 US 266, 101 LEd.2d 245, 108 SCt. 
2379(1988), is invoked for its decision that a prisoner's plead-
ings are considered "filed" when given to prison authorities to be 
mailed. 
0
 US Constitution, Amendment 4 and the analogous article 
of Utah's constitution are invoked and are applied to argument A, 
iii. 
0
 Utah Rules of Civil Proceedure 65B,sections (c) and (e) 
of the 1995 Utah Code correspond to sections (b) and (d) Rule 65B 
of the Utah Code from 1996 to present. They are invoked to demon-
strate the claims of the petition were properly filed under 65B. 
They are presented for the entire argument A, sections i, ii, and 
iii. 
* Bouie v. Columbia, 378 US "347, 12 LEd.2d 894, 84 SCt 1697(1964) 
Smith v. Scott, 223 F.3d 1191 (10th Cir. 2000) 
SLa tem^n* * M T isdicL Ion 
. - •• • -:.• * >t Appeals per Utah 
Code 7 S-2a-M 2; v h: . h o instanc matter L- an appeal from a decis-
ion in the Third Judicial District Courc, 
Constitutional provisions, statutes, and other 
d e t e r mi n a t i ve factors 
The Fourth -:-•< 1 < M 11 of tin MMI-'I iinl inn nl I h» i niLi'l hates 
of America, and the corresponding article or t;ne constitution of 
the state of Utah, the warrant requirement. 
The Fourteenth Amendment '*r ::he Constitutor ' a,: United. 
States of America, 1 i ;T h ,; r : the actions o ' . ) * . . . , * - ' zs 
c ^ • ' T.- a\>. .: . ace process ^f ,rA |_ ^nt ^iuzerib of 
k\ U . .-; states, and th* corresponding article of the constitution 
of the state of Utah, 
Title LS, Lnited States Code, Appendix 2: interstate Agree-
ment on '> ,'--:••• 
Utah Coco Annotated; 
^ (>--'[ * pre a n d p o s t 1 998 amendment), 
0
 URCP b5B sections ( M and id) (compare to sections (c) 
and (e) of the pre-1996 amendment" r»-< > t ; n ; Mile iiSi'p, 
URCP 65C (compare to 65B and the claims ot jetitioner). 
Issue Presented for Review 
There really is only one question presented for review- was 
the dismissal of the appellant's (hereinafter referred to as "Mr, 
Tucker") petition for relief proper? Yet this question itself, if 
it is to be answered, asks the questions: 
•was it proper to dismiss with prejudice valid claims of da-
mage when Mr, Tucker offered on the record at oral argument 
to withdraw them, and was not given the opportunity to am-
end the petition to remove them? , 
•was it proper to dismiss the remaining claims of the peti-
tion, for the stated reason of its containing an admixture 
of Utah Rules of Civil Proceedure Rules 65B and 65C (here-
inafter referred to as Rule 65B and 65C, respectively) with 
out allowing Mr. Tucker to amend the petition? , and 
•was it proper to dismiss the petition for the stated reas-
ons when-
a) Mr. Tucker stated on record that he makes no claims 
for post-conviction relief; 
b) The State identified no claims which were allegedly 
for post-conviction relief; and 
c) The State offered no evidence that any of Mr. Tuck-
er's claims were anything other than valid claims for 
extraordinary relief properly filed under Rule 65B. 
The question this Court must therefore ask itself is does 
the petition of Mr. Tucker contain claims for post-conviction re-
lief? If the answer to this question is in the negative then this 
Court must ask itself why Mr. Tucker's petition was dismissed in 
the first place? 
Whether Mr. Tucker's petition for extraordinary relief con-
tains claims for post-conviction relief is a mixed question of 
fact and of law. Mr. Tucker is unable to cite relevant authority 
pertaining to standard of review, or indeed much relevant author-
ity at all, due to the fact that he has no access to any state 
case-law at the federal facility where he is now housed. Mr. Tuck-
er asserts, however, that under Boag v. MacDougal,70 LEd.2d 551, 
a pro se litigant's pleadings must be construed liberally despite, 
among other things, a failure to cite proper legal authority. 
Statement of the Case 
This case is an appeal from a Third Judicial District Court's 
dismissal of a Rule 65B petition for extraordinary relief. Mr. 
Tucker filed his petion in the Third Judicial District Court as a 
response to actions made by the State of Utah during his parole 
violation and revocation process. The office of the Attorney Gen-
eral, acting as the respondent and representing the State of Utah, 
filed a motion to dismiss on procedural grounds, both as their re-
sponse and instead of answering the merits of the claims of the 
petition. Their claim- that Mr. Tucker's petition contained post-
conviction relief claims that should properly be filed under Rule 
65C. 
1. It is quite possible that the dismissal of Mr. Tucker's 
petition for the stated reasons amounts to a denial of due 
process, and thus was a manifest consttitutional error. 
Mr. Tucker filed a reply to the states motion to dismiss. Or-
al arguments were given before the Honorable Glen K. Iwasaki. At 
oral argument Mr. Tucker stated his belief that his claims were 
properly filed under Rule 65B as either "actions of the Board of 
Pardons11 (hereinafter referred to as the BOP) or as "other wrong-
ful restraints on personal liberty'1, both of which are plainly e-
numerated under Rule 65B. Mr. Tucker also made the offer at that 
time that he could withdraw the claims for damages from the pro-
ceedings . 
The state pointed out no specific claim as being one for post 
conviction relief, nor offered any evidence that any of Mr. Tuck-
er's claims were for post- conviction relief. However, and in re-
sponse to Mr. Tucker's admission that he used a 1995 volume of the 
Utah Code and filed his claims under subsections (c) and (e), the 
Attorney General pointed out that legislation had created a sepa-
rate rule, 65C, for post-conviction relief since 1995. The State 
then offered to send Mr. Tucker the updated versions of Rules 65B 
and 65C so that he could refile his claims properly. 
After hearing arguments the judge dismissed Mr. Tucker's 
claims for damages "with prejudice", and dismissed the rest of the 
petition with instructions that Mr. Tucker file his Rule 65B and 
Rule 65C issues in separate petitions. 
Summary of the Arguments 
Both the lower court and states counsel make a mistake in 
classifying Mr. Tucker's claims as claims for post-conviction re-
lief. Mr. Tucker thinks that this is a mistake both of fact and of 
law. Mr. Tucker could not possibly be seeking relief from his 1990 
state conviction for the simple reason that it occurred before the 
events of the parole violation process that he bases his petition 
on. Mr. Tucker's Utah sentence stems from an incident in April 
of 1990, for which he was sentenced in May of 1990. The incidents 
that form the basis of the petition, the arrest for parole viola-
tion, the intervening 19 months before revocation of parole, and 
the tolling of his Utah sentence while "paroled" to his federal 
sentence, all occurred after May, 1998. 
Further, Mr. Tucker could not possibly be seeking relief from 
the 2001 federal conviction that arose out of the parole violation 
investigation. The state court system has no power to grant relief 
over a federal conviction. Mr. Tucker is therefore at a loss as 
to how the state, as a respondent, and the lower court itself cha-
racterize the claims of the petition as being for post-conviction 
relief. The petion clearly identifies each claim as being either 
actions of the BOP, or other wrongful restraints on personal lib-
erty, both of which plainly fall under Rule 65B before or after 
the creation of Rule 65C. 
Finally, as a prisoner, Mr. Tucker was made to pay a sub-
stantial filing fee to file his petition. Even at a reduced fee 
of approximately $65. this fee represented more than 2 months 
wages for Mr. Tucker at the prison. Even if the petition were, as 
both the state and the court proclaim, a bastard "hybrid", Mr. 
Tucker should have been granted leave to amend the petition. 
ARGUMENTS 
A, The petition raises no claims for post-conviction relief. 
The court erred in accepting at face value the states con-
tention that Mr. Tuckerfs petition contained claims for post-con-
viction relief. There is nothing in the record to signify which of 
Mr. Tucker's claims it would have the court believe were claims 
for post-conviction relief. The court itself makes no identifica-
tion of any particular claims as being for post-conviction relief. 
And most importantly Mr. Tucker stated on record at oral argument 
that he made no claims for post-conviction relief, but only claims 
either against "actions of the Board of Pardons" or "other wrong-
ful restraints on personal liberty". 
The state obviously confuses the nature of Mr. Tucker's re-
quested relief as being a claim for post-conviction relief. The 
type of relief Mr. Tucker seeks, the immediate termination of his 
Utah sentence for example, might more customarily be reserved to 
claims of post-conviction relief, but it is also proper relief in 
an improper parole revocation process as well. And tha clearly 
falls under the egis of Rule 65B, as parole revocation in Utah is 
the sole dominion of the Board of Pardons. It is the actions of 
Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P) as wrongful restraints on lib-
erty, and the actions of the Board of Pardons (BOP), as they re-
late to Mr. Tucker's Utah parole violation, not any subsequent 
conviction, that he is seeking relief from. Thus Rule 65B. 
i The warrant for Mr, Tucker's arrest 
The BOP issued a warrant to AP&P for Mr, Tucker's arrest. 
This warrant, and indeed all arrest warrants issued by the BOP, 
stated that the subject was to be arrested and returned "to actual 
custody" so that a determination could be made as to whether there 
was probable cause to believe that the subject had violated his 
parole. An arrest warrant. Without probable cause. The Constitu-
tions of Utah and of the United States forbid this. This action by 
the BOP is but one of the claims for relief Mr. Tucker properly 
filed under Rule 65B. 
ii The cancelation of parole revocation hearing 
Mr. Tucker was arrested, under a "Board warrant", on 06-12-98 
and a parole revocation hearing was scheduled for 08-05-98. Upon 
that date Mr. Tucker was notified that this hearing was cancelled 
indefinitely, stated reason; "pending the adjudication of new cha-
rges". A "parole violation report" filed by the hearing officer 
that day stated that charges would be filed "in the next two 
weeks". The indictment issued by the Grand Jury was filed 08-19-98 
a full two weeks after the cancellation of Mr. Tucker's revocation 
hearing. In other words, the charges did not exist at the time of 
the cancellation of Mr. Tucker's revocation hearing. There were 
no "new charges" to adjudicate. 
2 
State v. Grate held that a person is not "charged" until 
2 Mr. Tucker is unable to supply case citation for two reasons, 
a complaint i s formally f i l e d a g a i n s t a person AND he i s served 
n o t i c e of the charges he must answer, where he must answer and 
when. The indic tment was not f i l e d u n t i l August 19, 1998- Mr. 
Tucker was not served u n t i l September 21 , 1998. Both of these e-
ven ts occurred a f ter the cance l l ed r e v o c a t i o n h e a r i n g . Obviously, 
no "new charges1 1 ex i s t ed a t the time Mr. T u c k e r ' s r e v o c a t i o n hea-
r i n g was c a n c e l l e d . This conc lus ion i s i n e s c a p a b l e . What t h i s am-
ounts to then i s the BOP e f f e c t i v e l y a r r e s t i n g Mr. Tucker and b i n -
ding him over for f ede ra l t r a i l , wirhout h i s even having been char 
ged with a c r ime . 
The BOP i s granted s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y to deny, g r a n t or r e -
voke p a r o l e s , to commute s e n t e n c e s , f i ne s or r e s t i t u t i o n . But the 
BOB i s not g ran ted the a u t h o r i t y to a r r a i g n s u s p e c t s , or even to 
make probable cause d e t e r m i n a t i o n s . This i s p r e c i s e l y the a c t i v -
i t i e s covered by the " ac t i ons of the Board of Pardons" subsec t ion 
of Rule 65B. 
Had Mr. Tucker been a c i t i z e n wi thout a p a r o l e , i t would have 
been r e q u i r e d t h a t he be a r r a i g n e d wi th in 72 hours or be r e l e a s e d . 
2. (cont.) when Mr. Tucker was transferred to federal custody upon "parole" 
he was not allowed to take his collected legal materials, which included his 
relevant state statutory code and case law. Further, the federal facil i ty in 
which Mr. Tucker is now housed provides no access to these materials. 
This is also the reason that Mr. Tucker is unable to c i te to the record 
in his brief as he was also unable to retain copies of the filings and plead-
ings made in the lower court. He was even denied, by the lower court, a copy 
of the transcript of the arguments presented on 01-28-02. 
As it was, Mr. Tucker was not officially arraigned until, or about 
October 25, 1998. By Utah statute Mr. Tucker was entitled to a re-
vocation hearing within 90 days or be released. Thus, even his di-
minished right as a parolee was violated. This is reminiscent of 
the agents of King George III, and the evils that the framers of 
the Constitution sought to protect us from. The Board of Pardons 
and Paroles has become a tyrant in the tradition of Goerge III 
himself. They think nothing of violating the constitution of their 
state, nor the Constitution of the United States, itself. It is 
therefore proper for Mr. Tucker to seek, under Rule 65B, as relief 
for his re-incarceration by the BOP, termination of his Utah sen-
tence. 
iii The tolling of Utah sentence while in federal custody 
First and foremost, this is an ex post facto application of a 
clause that did not even exist as a part of Utah Code (UC) 76-3-
203 when Mr. Tucker was sentenced in 1990. Yet by its application 
Mr. Tucker's Utah sentence expiration date is extended from 2005 
to the year 2009, effectively increasing the length of Mr. Tuckers 
sentence. This violates the ex post facto clause of Utah's cons-
titution, as well as the due process clause of the Fourteenth Am-
endment of the United States Constitution. 
Secondly, from a reading of UC 76-3-203(8) it is plain that 
the purpose of this section is to toll the sentence of a parolee 
who gets convicted in finds himself incarcerated in another state 
all while on parole to Utah. That is not the case here. Mr. Tuck-
er was not convicted while on parole. And in fact he had already 
been revoked for the activities which constituted his federal 
charges prior to his conviction on those charges. He was subse-
quently granted a new parole after conviction on those charges. 
It is this subsequent parole that is at issue here. 
Mr. Tucker was in the custody of the state of Utah, and could 
not begin his federal sentence until Utah relenquished custody of 
him. Utah is not anxiously awaiting the return of Mr. Tucker to 
their state so that they may violate his parole, and therefore 
toll his sentence until he is once again in their custody. Their 
act relenquished their custody. Or would the BOP have us believe 
that they could shuttle Mr. Tucker back and forth, from custody to 
custody at whim? They are thus proposing a construction of the 
statute that violates the very essence of the "interstate agree-
ment on detainers act". 
The BOP knew full well at the time they granted Mr. Tucker his 
parole that he would be going to a federal facility. Their grant 
of parole clearly demonstrates their intent that he should serve 
the remainder outside of their confinement. Was this then a false 
intent? Was the parole grant merely a pretense to effect a trans-
fer of custodyin violation of the "detainers" act? Mr. Tucker was 
released to a detainer. Utah has said "we have our pound of flesh? 
Are we to allow them to flout with impugnity the "detainers" act, 
as it has the constitution of its state, as well as that of the U-
nited states itself? 
If Mr. Tucker is indeed on parole, and has done nothing him-
self to invalidate that parole, then surely the clock must be run-
ing. Otherwise, of what value are the conditions of parole imposed 
upon him? He is in the same position as if his parole had been 
violated before it even took effect. Mr. Tucker has merely accept-
ed what was purported to be a grant of parole. Yet he is being 
treated exactly as if he has absconded from supervision and then 
subsequently violated the law. 
Or to look at it from another perspective, if Mr. Tucker were 
to be found guilty of using drugs, assault, or some other such se-
rious infraction while in federal custody on "parole", this would 
be sufficient to reincarcerate him upon his federal release. In-
deed, if this were not the case, then of what value are the parole 
conditions? There can therefore be only one conclusion: The state 
has released Mr. Tucker on parole. He was granted parole after his 
federal conviction, which itself occurred after the revocation of 
the parole he was serving when he committed the federal offense. 
Mr. Tucker has done nothing to violate the conditions of the lat-
est parole. The actions, movements, and transport of Mr. Tucker 
were all conducted with the BOPfs knowledge, and therefore with 
their authority and consent. Mr. Tucker's Parole, then, must be 
in effect, and the time he spendson "parole" during his federal 
sentence must be applied toward service of his Utah sentence. 
This action of the BOP in tolling Mr. Tucker's Utah sentence 
is properly filed under Rule 65B. 
ivActions of Adult Probation and Parole 
The same basic premise behind the arguments above apply also 
to the claims for relief due to the actions of Adult Probation and 
Parole (AP&P). It is by AP&P's contribution to the arrest and re-
incarceration of Mr. Tucker, as a parole violator, that Mr, Tuck-
er seeks relief, and not relief from his prior state or subsequent 
federal convictions. His claims against AP&P for their part in 
the violation and revocation of Mr. Tucker's parole were filed un-
der the "other wrongful restraints on personal liberty11 clause of 
Rule 65B. 
Even here the "hybrid petition" theory for dismissal fails, 
as Mr. Tucker is not attacking any conviction, His claims, there-
fore, cannot be claims for post conviction relief. At best, his 
claims might be said to be for "post revocation" relief. But, of 
course, there is no provision for "post revocation" relief, so Mr, 
Tucker's claims are properly filed under Rule 65B. 
TheAP&Pfs misuse of their authority to conduct warrantless 
searches by allowing police officers to search Mr. Tucker's apart-
ment the evening of June 11, 1998, without a search warrant, ost-
ensibly as a "parole violation search" becomes a valid ground for 
relief for Mr. Tucker when none of the evidencerecovered from the 
search was ever requested from the police by AP&P nor was it used 
at the revocation hearing that was finally held. Thus, AP&P were 
clearly acting as police, for the police, and were merely utili-
zing the parole search to assist the police in evading the warr-
ant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, and that of Utah's con-
stitution as well. 
The Court is reminded that Mr. Tucker was taken into custody 
as a suspected parole violator on the 11th of June, 1998 and was 
not revoked until the 2nd of February, 2000. He was incarcerated 
at the Utah State Prison the entire intervening 20 months. His re-
vocation hearing, scheduled for the 5th of August, 1998 was can-
celled pending the "adjudication of new charges" that had not even 
been filed yet. The arrest was effected by the device of a warrant 
which stated on its face that probable cause for the arrest had 
yet to be determined. Adult Probation and Parole was the arresting 
agency. It is for AP&Pfs contributions to the extended incarcera-
tion and delayed parole revocation that Mr. Tucker seeks relief by 
virtue of Rule 65B, for other wrongful restraints on personal lib-
erty . 
B. Mr, Tucker should have been allowed to amend the petition. 
Mr. Tucker offered, at oral argument, to withdraw the claims 
for damages from the proceedings. He was required to pay a filing 
fee on the petition which was a substantial part of his inmate wa-
ges, equivalent, in fact, to two months wages of the average in-
mate. If the petition in fact contained claims for post-c<zrnviction 
relief then it would have been proper to allow Mr. Tucker to amend 
the petition to separate the claims. 
Conclusion 
Mr. Tucker properly filed a petition seeking relief from the 
violation and revocation of his parole. The state of Utah, instead 
of answering the merits of the petition, chose as their response 
the frivolous argument that the petition was one for post-convic-
tion relief. This contention is not supported by either fact or by 
law. Mr. Tucker had also requested of the lower court that no con-
tinuances or extensions be granted, as this would have the effect 
of invalidating some of his claims due to the fact that on April 
2nd, 2002 he would be placed in the position of having to either 
accept or refuse his parole. 
The denial and dismissal of the petition was not warranted 
by the facts, was not in the interests of justice, benefitted only 
the state, and placed unnecessary rigor upon the petitioner by de-
laying a review of the facts until a time when the petitioner him-
self was forced to invalidate his claims. 
Mr. Tucker therefore requests that the remaining three years, 
two weeks and one day remaining of his Utah sentence at the time 
of his release on "parole1* to federal custody on April 2, 2002 be 
terminated in lieu of the three years, nine months and twenty one 
days that he spent re-incarcerated as a result of theviolations of 
his rights listed in the petition. This relief is requested speci-
fically for the reasons that; 
a.) the state forfeited any argument pertaining to the act-
ual merits of the petitioner's claims when they chose to 
answer by filing for dismissal on frivolous grounds, 
b.) the state misrepresented the facts to the lower court 
by claiming that the petition contained claims for post-
conviction relief, and 
c.) the lower court failed to establish factually that the 
petition did in fact contain claims for post-cornvition 
relief. 
If this Court cannot or will not grant this relief, Mr. Tuck-
er then requests reversal of the dismissal of his petition, and 
that it be remanded back to the court below with intructions to 
find in favor of the petitioner and grant him termination of his 
Utah sentenceeffective April 2, 2002, 
Mr. Tucker further requests that, unless mooted by the ter-
mination of his sentence, he be credited for time spent on parole 
to his federal sentence and that his parole time "run" with his 
federal time. 
Oral Arguments 
Oral argument is NOT requested, and it is in fact requested 
that oral arguments NOT be granted as this would create even fur-
ther delay and place the appellant in an even more inequitable po-
sition due to the unavailability of legal authority. Mr. Tucker is 
in the unenviable position of having to stand on the strength of 
the arguments contained herein. 
Signed by my hand and dated th is Q \X day of July, 2002. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ^s day of July, 2002, I 
mailed a copy of the forgoing, postage pre-paid, to the following 
Nancy L. Kemp 
160 E. 300 S. 6th floor 
P.O. Box 140856 
SLC, Ut. 84114-0856 
Q^a^ 
ADDENDUM 
A further note on Argument A,iii, the tolling of the Utah 
sentence, parole is a contract between the prisoner and the De-
partment of Corrections. There is a duly signed contract that 
contains no mention of the tolling of the sentence, only the con-
ditions under which the parole shall remain extant. As the con-
tract, known as "parole agreement" contains no provision for the 
tolling of the parolee's sentence while in federal custody the 
state is in violation of its contract with Mr. Tucker by tolling 
his Utah sentence while he is in federal custody. 
Mr. Tucker acknowledges his lack of exhibits and authorities 
in this document, and makes abject appology for this. But this is 
beyond his control as he was not allowed to take his collected 
documents into federal custody when he was released on "parole" 
from the Utah State Prison on April 2, 2002. It is hoped that the 
Court will be liberal in this respect, and review the foregoing 
in the eye of spying what strengths Mr. Tucker was able to sup-
ly under the circumstances. 
